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(p. 126) 6. Justifications of punishment and questions of penal legitimacy 

(p. 126) 6. Justifications of punishment and questions of penal legitimacy
Chapter:
(p. 126) 6. Justifications of punishment and questions of penal legitimacy
Author(s):

David Scott

DOI:
10.1093/he/9780199694969.003.0006
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date: 13 November 2019

This chapter examines the three main ways to approach the justifications of punishment. These are consequentialist philosophies that look to justify punishment in terms of preventing future offending; retributive philosophies that focus on responding proportionately to the actual offence; and abolitionist philosophies which maintain that punishment cannot be either morally or politically justified.

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