Show Summary Details
Page of

(p. 642) 9. Horizontal Agreements—Cartels and Collusion 

(p. 642) 9. Horizontal Agreements—Cartels and Collusion
Chapter:
(p. 642) 9. Horizontal Agreements—Cartels and Collusion
Author(s):

Alison Jones

, Brenda Sufrin

, and Niamh Dunne

DOI:
10.1093/he/9780198824657.003.0009
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD LAW TROVE (www.oxfordlawtrove.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Law Trove for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 25 February 2021

This chapter examines how EU competition law applies both to undertakings operating cartels and to undertakings that tacitly coordinate their behaviour on a market. It starts by looking at the difference between ‘explicit’ and ‘tacit’ collusion in the light of the theory of games and the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’. The chapter then deals with cartels and other agreements akin to cartels, or which may facilitate explicit or tacit collusion on a market. Next, it considers the problem of tacit collusion and whether, in particular, Articles 101 and 102 operate as effective mechanisms for dealing with the oligopoly problem. The chapter also considers other options that EU competition law might offer to deal with tacit collusion, either ex ante or ex post, such as the use of the concept of collective dominance and sector enquiries under Regulation 1/2003, art 17.

Access to the complete content on Law Trove requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access code, please see the information provided with the code or instructions printed within the title for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.