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Chapter

Chapter 9 focuses on the doctrine of legal professional privilege. Technically, this encompasses two separate privileges: legal advice privilege, which protects communications between client and legal adviser; and litigation privilege, which protects communications between client or legal adviser and a third party, so long as preparation for litigation is the dominant purpose of the communication. Legal advice privilege, unlike litigation privilege, is regarded as ‘absolute’ and incapable of being overridden. The chapter also briefly looks at ‘without prejudice privilege’, aspects of which the House of Lords and Supreme Court have considered in relatively recent years.

Chapter

Chapter 9 focuses on the doctrine of legal professional privilege. Technically, this encompasses two separate privileges: legal advice privilege, which protects communications between client and legal adviser; and litigation privilege, which protects communications between client or legal adviser and a third party, so long as preparation for litigation is the dominant purpose of the communication. Legal advice privilege, unlike litigation privilege, is regarded as ‘absolute’ and incapable of being overridden. The chapter also briefly looks at ‘without prejudice privilege’, aspects of which the House of Lords and Supreme Court have considered in relatively recent years.

Chapter

This chapter looks at the rules relating to legal professional privilege and, in outline, the doctrine of the privilege against self-incrimination. Under these provisions potentially relevant evidence may be excluded at trial. The role of legal professional privilege in protecting defendants in criminal trials is outlined and the absolutist stance of the courts discussed. The chapter outlines the various immunities which are embraced under the privilege against self-incrimination.

Chapter

This chapter looks at the rules relating to legal professional privilege and, in outline, the doctrine of the privilege against self-incrimination. Under these provisions potentially relevant evidence may be excluded at trial. The role of legal professional privilege in protecting defendants in criminal trials is outlined and the absolutist stance of the courts discussed. The chapter outlines the various immunities which are embraced under the privilege against self-incrimination. Summarizing some recent case law, the chapter reflects on the extent to which the privilege may now extend to a broader set of circumstances than the earlier authorities suggested. For example, the privilege may not necessarily be unavailable against the use of compelled questions in an administrative enquiry.

Chapter

This chapter concerns privilege. A witness is ‘privileged’ when they may validly claim not to answer a question, or to supply information relevant to the determination of an issue in judicial proceedings. Because the effect is to deprive the tribunal of relevant evidence, powerful arguments are required for such rules. Modern law has reduced their number and scope, although this is arguably balanced by an increase in their status, which has been further enhanced by implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This chapter discusses certain types of privilege: the privilege against self-incrimination, legal professional privilege, privilege for statements made without prejudice as part of an attempt to settle a dispute, and a privilege derived from the former for statements made to a conciliator.

Chapter

This chapter discusses several well-established principles whereby relevant evidence is excluded because of extrinsic considerations which outweigh the value that the evidence would have at trial. Three types of privilege are considered: (i) the privilege against self-incrimination (including statutory withdrawal of the privilege, compatibility with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the compulsory production of pre-existing documents and materials, and substituted protection); (ii) legal professional privilege, which enables a client to protect the confidentiality of (a) communications between him and his lawyer made for the purpose of obtaining and giving legal advice (known as ‘legal advice privilege’) and (b) communications between him or his lawyer and third parties for the dominant purpose of preparation for pending or contemplated litigation (known as ‘litigation privilege’); and (iii) ‘without prejudice’ privilege, which enables settlement negotiations to be conducted without fear of proposed concessions being used in evidence at trial as admissions.

Chapter

This chapter discusses several well-established principles whereby relevant evidence is excluded because of extrinsic considerations which outweigh the value that the evidence would have at trial. Three types of privilege are considered: (i) the privilege against self-incrimination (including statutory withdrawal of the privilege, compatibility with Art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the compulsory production of pre-existing documents and materials, and substituted protection); (ii) legal professional privilege, which enables a client to protect the confidentiality of (a) communications between him and his lawyer made for the purpose of obtaining and giving legal advice (known as ‘legal advice privilege’) and (b) communications between him or his lawyer and third parties for the dominant purpose of preparation for pending or contemplated litigation (known as ‘litigation privilege’); and (iii) ‘without prejudice’ privilege, which enables settlement negotiations to be conducted without fear of proposed concessions being used in evidence at trial as admissions.

Chapter

A privilege is a rule of law that permits a witness to refuse to answer a question, or a party to refuse to produce certain materials. This chapter discusses the privilege against self-incrimination. Legal professional privilege, consisting of legal advice and litigation privilege, is explained along with the exceptions and the importance of the ‘dominant purpose’ rule in litigation privilege and the limitation of litigation privilege to adversarial, and not investigative or inquisitorial, proceedings. Other privileges, in particular the ‘without prejudice’ rule in civil cases, and the protection of sources of information contained in publications under the Contempt of Court Act 1981, s. 10, are also examined.

Book

Cross & Tapper on Evidence has become firmly established as a classic of legal literature. This thirteenth edition reflects on all recent changes and developments in this fast-moving subject. In particular, it fully examines new case law relevant to evidence of privilege, character, and hearsay. The inclusion of some comparative material provides an excellent basis for the critical appraisal of English law. This book remains the definitive guide to the law of evidence.

Chapter

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions. Each book includes typical questions, bullet-pointed answer plans and suggested answers, author commentary and illustrative diagrams and flow charts. This chapter covers witnesses, who are a principal source of evidence, and the rules relating to their attendance. All witnesses with relevant information are assumed to be competent to give evidence and usually compellable to give evidence, as the court may summon them to attend. Interests of the witness are secondary to the need of the court to have all necessary information. Some witnesses who are competent may claim a privilege not to give evidence, including defendants on their own behalf. Other exceptions comprise spouses or civil partners testifying for the prosecution. This is based on the concept that compulsion may lead to marital discord. The chapter also includes a review of Special Measures Directions for vulnerable witnesses.

Chapter

Celebrated for their conceptual clarity, titles in the Clarendon Law Series offer concise, accessible overviews of major fields of law and legal thought. This chapter deals with the law of defamation. The basic rules of the common law of defamation state that: A is liable for saying anything to C about B which would be apt to make an average citizen think worse of the latter. In principle, B can sue A without having to show that what A said was false, that it caused him any harm, or that A was at any way at fault in saying it. The chapter distinguishes between what is ‘defamatory’ and what is not. It discusses the liability for the act of communication is called ‘publication’. It also considers defences: to apparent allegations of fact, the only defences are truth (called ‘justification’) and privilege; for statements of opinion, which cannot be false but at the most simulated, the defence is ‘fair comment on a matter of public interest’.

Chapter

Without assuming prior legal knowledge, books in the Directions series introduce and guide readers through key points of law and legal debate. Questions, diagrams, and exercises help readers to engage fully with each subject and check their understanding as they progress. Defences to defamation protect freedom of speech in English law. Some of the defences are ‘absolute’ while others are ‘qualified’. Absolute defence means that regardless of how careless the defendant has been in publishing the statement or whether he has been motivated by malice, he is completely protected. Qualified defence applies to a wider range of situations, but fails if the claimant can show that the statement was made ‘maliciously’. This chapter looks at the amendments to the existing defences to defamation contained in the Defamation Act 2013, and the introduction of new defences to protect operators of websites that host user-generated content are also examined.

Chapter

Without assuming prior legal knowledge, books in the Directions series introduce and guide readers through key points of law and legal debate. Questions, diagrams, and exercises help readers to engage fully with each subject and check their understanding as they progress. Defences to defamation protect freedom of speech in English law. Some of the defences are ‘absolute’ while others are ‘qualified’. Absolute defence means that regardless of how careless the defendant has been in publishing the statement or whether he has been motivated by malice, he is completely protected. Qualified defence applies to a wider range of situations, but fails if the claimant can show that the statement was made ‘maliciously’. This chapter looks at the amendments to the existing defences to defamation contained in the Defamation Act 2013 and the introduction of new defences to protect operators of websites that host user-generated content are also examined.

Chapter

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions. Each book includes typical questions, bullet-pointed answer plans and suggested answers, author commentary and diagrams and flow charts. This chapter covers evidence excluded for policy or public interest considerations: public interest immunity (PII). A party, witness or non-participant in proceedings may refuse to disclose information, papers or answer questions, even though such material may be highly relevant and reliable. If PII applies, neither party has access to the evidence. For privilege, the areas most likely to occur in Evidence courses are privilege against self-incrimination and legal professional privilege. The former includes the right to silence of the defendant. The privilege against self-incrimination is generally upheld by common law and by implication by Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Legal professional privilege is a common law exclusionary rule principle that applies in civil and criminal proceedings.

Chapter

The term ‘private privilege’ relates to separate privileges that prevent evidence from being disclosed in litigation, or witnesses from being compelled to answer questions at trial. In a criminal case, privilege may be claimed in two situations: legal professional privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination. This chapter discusses legal professional privilege in criminal cases; legal professional privilege and the courts; waiving legal professional privilege; the privilege against self-incrimination; and the privilege against self-incrimination and the European Convention on Human Rights 1950.

Chapter

Benjamin Bowling, Robert Reiner, and James Sheptycki

The chapter surveys theories concerning the hybrid nature of the plural policing web. It evaluates the claim that a fundamental shift in policing occurred at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Holding police métier as a definitional constant, the chapter examines how policing is enacted from different institutional positions in plural policing. It outlines the history of claims about the rise of plural policing before discussing its relation to law, the military, technology, territory, locality, the rising importance of private ‘high policing’, and the centrality of surveillance. The chapter demonstrates the complex opportunity structure of the plural policing web, the variety of legal and technological tools involved in its operations, and suggests that it poses fundamental problems for the democratic governance of police that have not been resolved. It concludes that there is both continuity and change in the politics of the police and that claims of a fundamental break have been overstated.

Chapter

This chapter examines the legal framework governing international organizations. It begins with an examination of the history, role, and nature of international organizations. It is argued that although the constituent instruments and practices of each organization differ, there are common legal principles which apply to international organizations. The chapter focuses on the identification and exploration of those common legal principles. There is an examination of the manner in which international organizations acquire legal personality in international and domestic law and the consequences of that legal personality. There is also discussion of the manner in which treaties establishing international organizations are interpreted and how this differs from ordinary treaty interpretation. The legal and decision-making competences of international organizations are considered as are the responsibility of international organizations and their privileges and immunities. Finally, the chapter examines the structure and powers of what is the leading international organization—the United Nations (UN).

Chapter

Martin Hannibal and Lisa Mountford

The term ‘private privilege’ relates to separate privileges that prevent evidence from being disclosed in litigation, or witnesses from being compelled to answer questions at trial. In a criminal case, privilege may be claimed in two situations: legal professional privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination. This chapter discusses legal professional privilege in criminal cases; legal professional privilege and the courts; waiving legal professional privilege; the privilege against self-incrimination; and the privilege against self-incrimination and the European Convention on Human Rights 1950.

Chapter

This chapter is concerned with the two chambers of Parliament, which, together with the Queen, collectively form Parliament: these are the House of Commons (HC) and the House of Lords (HL). The composition of both Houses is considered in this chapter, and attention is given to the officers of the House of Commons; the life of Parliament; House of Commons sittings; and the committee system. The electoral franchise is discussed and attention is focused on the important issues of electoral reform and the reform of the House of Lords. The chapter concludes by considering what is meant by the term ‘parliamentary privilege’.

Chapter

Chapter 5 deals with the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination. It considers relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. These include sections 34, 36, and 37, which permit adverse inferences to be drawn from certain failures of the defendant at the pre-trial stage. Section 34, in particular, has generated a substantial body of case law. The manner in which the Court of Appeal has resolved the issue of silence on legal advice has been subjected to particular criticism. The operation of section 34 has been held to be compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights so long as a sufficiently watertight direction is given to the jury. The implications for the privilege against self-incrimination of statutory provisions that criminalize the failure to provide information to law enforcement authorities are also considered.