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Cover Smith, Hogan, and Ormerod's Criminal Law

7. Assistance after the offence  

David Ormerod and Karl Laird

This chapter examines the statutory offences under the Criminal Law Act 1967 of assisting an offender. Examples include hiding a principal offender, helping a principal offender to avoid arrest or to abscond from bail, lying to the police to protect the principal offender from investigation and prosecution, hiding the weapon used by the principal offender in committing the assault/robbery and washing clothes worn by the principal offender to obstruct any potential forensic examination. In addition to the fact that the offender must have committed a relevant offence, another element in the actus reus where an offender is charged with impeding the apprehension or prosecution of the offender is that the accused must have done ‘any act’ with the appropriate intent. An attempt to commit this offence does not amount to criminal liability.

Chapter

Cover Criminal Law

15. Complicity  

This chapter begins with a discussion of the law of complicity, covering principals and accomplices; five ways one can be an accomplice; mens rea for accomplices; secondary participation and inchoate offences; conviction of the secondary party and acquittal of the principal; whether a secondary party can be guilty of a greater offence than the principal; withdrawal by a secondary party; accessories and victims; and assistance after the offence. The second part of the chapter focuses on accessories and the theory of complicity, covering general theories of accessorial liability; theories of accessorial mens rea; the theory of joint enterprise; actus reus issues; withdrawal; and law reform.

Chapter

Cover Smith, Hogan and Ormerod's Essentials of Criminal Law

12. Parties to crime  

David Ormerod and John Child

This chapter examines the criminal liability of parties to a crime. Where D involves herself in the crime of another, and that crime is completed, D may not just be liable for her inchoate role, but may be additionally liable as an accomplice. As such, she is labelled and punished in the same way as the principal. This chapter begins with an overview of the current law of complicity and the circumstances where uncertainty can emerge in determining whether D is a principal or an accomplice. It then considers the elements of complicity by aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring; the abolition of complicity by joint enterprise; the relationship between complicity and inchoate liability; and available defences. It outlines options for legal reform concerning complicity and the potential application of complicity within a problem question. Relevant cases are highlighted throughout the chapter, with brief summaries of the main facts and judgments.

Chapter

Cover Smith, Hogan, and Ormerod's Essentials of Criminal Law

12. Parties to crime  

This chapter examines the criminal liability of parties to a crime. Where D involves herself in the crime of another, and that crime is completed, D may not just be liable for her inchoate role, but may be additionally liable as an accomplice. As such, she is labelled and punished in the same way as the principal. This chapter begins with an overview of the current law of complicity and the circumstances where uncertainty can emerge in determining whether D is a principal or an accomplice. It then considers the elements of complicity by aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring; the abolition of complicity by joint enterprise; the relationship between complicity and inchoate liability; and available defences. It outlines options for legal reform concerning complicity and the potential application of complicity within a problem question. Relevant cases are highlighted throughout the chapter, with brief summaries of the main facts and judgments.

Chapter

Cover Smith, Hogan, and Ormerod's Criminal Law

6. Parties to crime  

David Ormerod and Karl Laird

A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures another to commit an offence is criminally liable and known as an ‘accessory’ or a ‘secondary party’. This chapter focuses on the basis of their liability, the distinction between accessories and principals, how secondary liability differs from inchoate liability, the principal offender, innocent agency, the accessory’s actus reus, whether an omission is sufficient and whether mere presence at the crime is enough. The chapter discusses the Supreme Court decision in Jogee, examining problems of ‘joint enterprise liability’, issues of terminology, the significance of the doctrine of joint enterprise in murder and why the Supreme Court characterized it as involving a ‘wrong turn’. It also deals with withdrawal by a secondary party before the principal offender commits the crime, victims as parties to crime and instigation by law enforcement officers for the purpose of entrapment.

Chapter

Cover Criminal Law

7. Parties to crime  

Michael J. Allen and Ian Edwards

Course-focused and contextual, Criminal Law provides a succinct overview of the key areas on the law curriculum balanced with thought-provoking contextual discussion. This chapter discusses the meaning of accomplices, vicarious liability, joint enterprise liability, and corporate liability. All the parties to a crime are accomplices. The person who perpetrates the crime is the principal. Others, not being principals, who participate in the commission of an offence are referred to as accessories or secondary parties and will be liable to conviction if it is proved that they aided, abetted, counselled, or procured the commission of the crime by the principal. Vicarious liability is a form of strict liability arising from the employer–employee relationship, without reference to any fault of the employer. A corporation is a legal person and therefore may be criminally liable, even though it has no physical existence and cannot act or think except through its directors or employees.