This chapter explores irrationality, the second ground for judicial review identified by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v Minister for the Civil Service. It examines the meaning of this principle, its foundation upon the test of unreasonableness, and the approach that the courts have adopted since that case. Irrationality, and the notion of unreasonableness upon which it is based, is a particularly vague and ambiguous term, with a range of possible interpretations and meanings. This has meant that the courts have often considered judicial review claims, brought on the basis of irrationality, with varying degrees of caution, often employing the necessary tests with notable stringency. In part as a result of this, and in part also due to the increasing influence of European legal practices on the UK system, the test of proportionality has developed as a substantive ground for judicial review, often overlapping and sometimes conflicting with application of the irrationality doctrine.
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Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19, Supreme Court. This case considers the introduction of proportionality as a ground of judicial review beyond human rights and European Union law in the United Kingdom. The relationship between proportionality and Wednesbury unreasonableness is also discussed. The document also includes supporting commentary and questions from author Thomas Webb.
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Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Smith and Grady v United Kingdom [1999] ECHR 72, European Court of Human Rights. This case examined the now-defunct provisions against gay people serving in the British military, and how using either unreasonableness or proportionality produced different outcomes. It also considers the contribution which a rights-based approach to legal questions, drawing on proportionality, can make to the development of law and policy. The document also includes supporting commentary and questions from author Thomas Webb.
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Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, Court of Appeal. This case note considers the concept of unreasonableness as articulated in Wednesbury and reflects on its relationship to that of proportionality. The document also includes supporting commentary and questions from author Thomas Webb.
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This chapter explores irrationality, the second ground for judicial review identified by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v Minister for the Civil Service. It examines the meaning of this principle, its foundation upon the test of unreasonableness, and the approach that the courts have adopted since that case. Irrationality, and the notion of unreasonableness upon which it is based, is a particularly vague and ambiguous term, with a range of possible interpretations and meanings. This has meant that the courts have often considered judicial review claims, brought on the basis of irrationality, with varying degrees of caution, often employing the necessary tests with notable stringency. In part as a result of this, and in part also due to the increasing influence of European legal practices on the UK system, the test of proportionality has developed as a substantive ground for judicial review, often overlapping and sometimes conflicting with application of the irrationality doctrine.
Chapter
Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, Court of Appeal. This case note considers the concept of unreasonableness as articulated in Wednesbury and reflects on its relationship to that of proportionality. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.
Chapter
Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Smith and Grady v United Kingdom [1999] ECHR 72, European Court of Human Rights. This case examined the now-defunct provisions against gay people serving in the British military, and how using either unreasonableness or proportionality produced different outcomes. It also considers the contribution which a rights-based approach to legal questions, drawing on proportionality, can make to the development of law and policy. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.
Chapter
Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19, Supreme Court. This case considers the introduction of proportionality as a ground of judicial review beyond human rights and European Union law in the United Kingdom. The relationship between proportionality and Wednesbury unreasonableness is also discussed. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.
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Essential Cases: Tort Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in St Helen’s Smelting Co. v Tipping [1865] 11 ER 642. The document also included supporting commentary from author Craig Purshouse.
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Essential Cases: Tort Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in St Helen’s Smelting Co. v Tipping [1865] 11 ER 642. The document also included supporting commentary from author Craig Purshouse.
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This chapter examines the concept of Wednesbury unreasonabless/irrationality which has operated as a core principle to determine the threshold for judicial intervention in judicial review cases. As well as explaining the origins and meaning of the Wednesbury test, the relevant case law is discussed to explain how the Wednesbury threshold has been adjusted according to the wider context. For example, this explains how the so called super Wednesbury standard applies to core policy areas, where judges may be reluctant to intervene, while in the field of human rights, a sub-Wednesbury/anxious scrutiny test might be applied, lowering the standard for judicial intervention. The chapter discusses and compares the proportionality test as a balancing exercise which applies to human rights cases. Its application is illustrated with reference to significant case law including: Denbigh High School, International Transport Roth, A v Home Secretary, Pro Life Alliance, Axa, and Lord Carlile.
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This chapter discusses the grounds for divorce under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. These include adultery, unreasonable behaviour, desertion, two years’ separation plus consent, and five years’ separation. It also outlines the first year bar on divorce and the ground for divorce being that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. The chapter explores each of the five possible facts that prove the ground for divorce and explains the relevance of continued cohabitation between the parties in relation to unreasonable behaviour and adultery. It also discusses continuous separation. Some discussion of the proposals for no-fault divorce is also included in this chapter.
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Titles in the Complete series combine extracts from a wide range of primary materials with clear explanatory text to provide readers with a complete introductory resource. This chapter, which discusses the circumstances for judicial review of a public authority’s decision on the grounds that it is irrational, first explains the history of irrationality and ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’, to provide some background to the topic and to chart its development. It then considers cases in which the courts have discussed different versions of the irrationality test, discusses the difference between irrationality and proportionality, and examines the development of proportionality and its use in judicial review cases. The chapter distinguishes between proportionality and merits review and discusses the use of judicial deference by the courts. Proportionality, and not irrationality, is the test used to determine whether a public authority has acted unlawfully when its decision is challenged by judicial review under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The irrationality test is used in non-Human Rights Act judicial review cases, but the courts have also used the proportionality test in cases involving common law rights. The chapter concludes by considering the discussion in the case law and the scholarship as to whether the irrationality test should be replaced by the test of proportionality across both types of case: traditional judicial review cases and those involving a human rights issue.
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Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter discusses the grounds for judicial review. These include irrationality—meaning unreasonableness—which is now linked to the principle of proportionality. In addition, the relevant case law and key principles concerning distinction between procedural and merits-based judicial review are fully explained. The impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on judicial review is assessed generally. The emergence and development of the ‘outcomes is all’ approach to judicial review where breach of Convention rights is alleged is explored by examining a number of significant House of Lords cases.
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Mark Elliott and Jason Varuhas
This chapter examines the content and scope of the duty to give reasons, suggesting that giving reasons for decisions should be treated as a central facet of procedural fairness in administrative law. It first differentiates the duty to give reasons from the duty to give notice, the possibility of inferring unreasonableness from an absence of reasons, the proportionality doctrine, and the duty of candour. It then considers why reasons are required and goes on to discuss the duty to give reasons at common law. It also describes statutory duties and other duties to give reasons, paying attention to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Finally, it analyzes the question of whether a duty to give reasons has been discharged, and provides an overview of the remedial consequences of a breach of the duty to give reasons.
