Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter discusses the liability of parties who participate in the criminal acts of others. Liability can be split into four parts: those who are accessories, those who are joint perpetrators, those who are vicariously liable, and those who are corporations. Accessories are those who aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of the principal offence. Participants who enter a joint venture (also known as a joint unlawful enterprise) are liable for the crimes committed as part of that venture, unless one of the parties deliberately departs from the agreed plan. The doctrine of vicarious liability has a (limited) role in the criminal law. A corporation is a legal person, so criminal liability can be imposed on a corporation for many (although not all) crimes.
Chapter
This chapter examines the issue of complicity. ‘Complicity’ arises when two or more people agree to commit an offence which is then committed by one of more of them, or when a person plays a supporting role in the commission of an offence. The discussions cover the distinction between principals (those who commit the crime itself) and accessories (those who assist or encourage its commission). The discussion involves addressing complex questions about the conduct element in complicity, the fault element in complicity, joint ventures, and accessorial liability for different results. Also covered are derivative liability, the ‘missing link’, and special defences to complicity.
Chapter
Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter discusses the liability of parties who participate in the criminal acts of others. Liability can be split into four parts: those who are accessories, those who are joint perpetrators, those who are vicariously liable, and those who are corporations. Accessories are those who aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of the principal offence. Participants who enter a joint venture (also known as a joint unlawful enterprise) are liable for the crimes committed as part of that venture, unless one of the parties deliberately departs from the agreed plan. The doctrine of vicarious liability has a (limited) role in the criminal law. A corporation is a legal person, so criminal liability can be imposed on a corporation for many (although not all) crimes.
Chapter
Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, Laurel Baig, Mary Fan, Christopher Gosnell, and Alex Whiting
This chapter discusses the two major theories that are currently in use in international criminal law to address group criminality: joint criminal enterprise; and co-perpetration by control over the crime. Under these theories, each participant will be treated as a principal, provided that he played a sufficiently important role in the commission of the crime. Gradations of culpability may be taken into account at the sentencing stage. In addition, although joint criminal enterprise focuses on shared intention and co-perpetration focuses on shared action, the application of either theory will yield the same result in most cases. Indirect perpetration is then analyzed.
Chapter
David Gadd
This chapter outlines the key definitional and aetiological issues surrounding domestic violence perpetration. It begins with international estimates of the prevalence of domestic violence, many of which confine themselves to assessments of the percentage of women worldwide who have ever been physically or sexually assaulted by a partner. The second section of the chapter reviews the British historical literature to show how Victorian concern with the protection of respectable women from ‘wife-beaters’ yielded to a medical-psychiatric discourse that blamed hysterical women for provoking men with quick tempers. It then outlines how twentieth-century feminist accounts reframed the problem of ‘wife-beating’ variously in terms of ‘domestic violence’, ‘domestic abuse’, ‘intimate partner violence’, ‘coercive control’, and ‘gender-based violence’ in efforts that exposed the roles of sexism, inadequate legal protection, and gender inequality in perpetuating a ‘continuum’ of abuse against women under patriarchy. The third part of the chapter appraises the critique of gender-based perspectives provided by: psychological studies, some of which point to ‘gender symmetry’ in the perpetration of domestic violence and some of which reveal personality differences between perpetrators and non-violent men; and sociological studies that expose how the intersections between gender and ethnicity, sexuality and age manifest themselves, both in incidents of domestic violence and in official reactions to them. The chapter concludes by pointing to the challenge of finding a common voice capable of capturing the collective experiences of those in need of protection from domestic violence as well as the need to find ways of responding to perpetrators whose attitudes, motives, backgrounds are not necessarily identical to each other. These challenges are rendered more acute when the law is revealed as unpredictable in its capacity to determine the culpability of the small minority of men who perpetrate grievous assaults on their partners.
Chapter
This chapter examines the issue of complicity. ‘Complicity’ arises when two or more people agree to commit an offence which is then committed by one or more of them, or when a person plays a supporting role in the commission of an offence. The discussions cover the distinction between principals (those who commit the crime itself) and accessories (those who assist or encourage its commission). The discussion involves addressing complex questions about the conduct element in complicity, the fault element in complicity, joint ventures, and accessorial liability for different results. Also covered are derivative liability, the ‘missing link’, and special defences to complicity. Finally, some elements of complicity bearing on offences of public order are discussed, to show their relevance to civil liberties.
Chapter
The commission of an offence may involve not only the perpetrator of the offence but also other people in criminal liability in various ways. A person who directly brings about the actus reus of an offence with the relevant mens rea is known as the perpetrator (or principal). While an accomplice (also known as an accessory or secondary party) participates in the commission of an offence, he does not in law directly bring about its actus reus, even if his assistance or encouragement causes the perpetrator to act as he does. This chapter explains the liability of an accomplice before and after the commission of an offence. It considers joint perpetrators, innocent agency, principal offence, intentional perpetration of an offence which is not the common purpose of a joint criminal venture (a principle which has recently changed with the Supreme Court decision in Jogee), differential liability, victims as accomplices, entrapment and agents provocateurs, withdrawal from participation, and reform of the law of complicity.
Chapter
Neil Chakraborti and Amy Clarke
This chapter examines the extent of hate crimes in the age of crises. It acknowledges how the concept of hate crime is notoriously complex and contested. The continued rise of hate incidents paints a worrying picture of seemingly legitimized hostile and prejudiced attitudes rooted within wider structural inequalities. Even though ne and physical hostility is normalized, legitimized, and politically weaponized, there is a deafening silence from national governments when it comes to addressing the underlying causes of hate crime. The chapter considers the complex realities of perpetration and victimization in an effort to improve responses to hate crime in times of increasing fragility and uncertainty.
Chapter
David Gadd
This chapter outlines the key definitional and aetiological issues surrounding domestic violence perpetration. It begins with a discussion of how the COVID-19 pandemic impacted on domestic abuse globally, before assessing international estimates of the percentage of women worldwide who have ever been physically or sexually assaulted by a partner. The second section of the chapter reviews the British historical literature to show how Victorian concern with the protection of respectable women from ‘wife-beaters’ yielded to a medical-psychiatric discourse that blamed hysterical women for provoking men with quick tempers. It then outlines how twentieth-century feminist accounts reframed the problem of ‘wife-beating’ variously in terms of ‘domestic violence’, ‘domestic abuse’, ‘intimate partner violence’, ‘coercive control’, and ‘gender-based violence’ in efforts that exposed the roles of sexism, inadequate legal protection, and gender inequality in perpetuating a ‘continuum’ of abuse against women under patriarchy. The third part of the chapter appraises the critique of gender-based perspectives provided by psychological studies, some of which point to ‘gender symmetry’ in the perpetration of domestic violence and some of which reveal personality differences between perpetrators and non-violent men; as well as sociological studies that expose how the intersections between gender and ethnicity, sexuality and age manifest themselves, both in incidents of domestic violence and in official reactions to them. The chapter concludes by pointing to the challenge of finding a common voice capable of capturing the collective experiences of those in need of protection from domestic violence as well as the need to find ways of responding to perpetrators whose attitudes, motives, backgrounds are not necessarily identical to each other. These challenges are rendered more acute when the law is revealed as unpredictable in its capacity to determine the culpability of the small minority of men who perpetrate grievous assaults on their partners.
Chapter
This chapter focuses on the crime of aggression. It first traces the historical development crime of aggression. It then addresses the question of who can be considered a perpetrator of the crime; outlines the manner in which the crime can be committed; examines the controversial question of how ‘aggression’ is to be defined for the purposes of the offence; and distinguishes between aggression and lawful uses of military force in international law. The remainder of the chapter discusses some controversial cases of the use of force and whether they might constitute aggression; outlines the mental element required; explains the applicable law before the International Criminal Court (ICC); and explores the possibility of prosecuting acts of aggression before national courts.
Chapter
This chapter examines the commission of crimes. It distinguishes between principals and accessories. It considers a range of ways of being involved in crimes, called ‘modes of participation in crimes’, such as aiding and abetting, ordering or inciting crimes, or being responsible for crimes as a superior. Further, two special doctrines of ‘commission’ have grown up before international tribunals to describe the involvement of leaders as principals in international crimes. These are called joint criminal enterprise and co-perpetration, respectively. Finally, the chapter considers what happens when the one set of facts might satisfy the elements of several different international crimes, giving rise to issues of concurrence of crimes.
