1-8 of 8 Results

  • Keyword: legitimate expectations x
Clear all

Chapter

Extracts have been chosen from a wide range of historical and contemporary cases to illustrate the reasoning processes of the courts and to show how legal principles are developed. This chapter introduces the nature and constitutional role of judicial review. It then examines the various grounds of review, which have been placed in three classes: illegality, procedural impropriety, and irrationality. The chapter also discusses the substantive aspect of legitimate expectations and the relationship between irrationality and proportionality in pure domestic law.

Chapter

This chapter introduces the nature and constitutional role of judicial review. It then examines the various grounds of review, which have been placed in three classes: illegality, procedural impropriety, and irrationality. The chapter also discusses the substantive aspect of legitimate expectations and the relationship between irrationality and proportionality in pure domestic law.

Chapter

Sir William Wade and Christopher Forsyth

This chapter discusses the right to a fair hearing, which has been used by the courts as a base on which to build a kind of code of fair administrative procedure, comparable to ‘due process of law’ under the Constitution of the United States. Topics covered include administrative cases and statutory hearings, the retreat from natural justice, the right to be heard, the protection of legitimate expectations, and exceptions to the right to a fair hearing.

Chapter

Mark Elliott and Jason Varuhas

This chapter examines the doctrine of legitimate expectation and its application to lawfully created expectations as well as the extent, if any, to which it may protect ‘unlawfully generated expectations’. It first explains why legitimate expectations must be protected and goes on to discuss the relationship between two variables that are in play in any situation which potentially engages the legitimate expectation principle: that of legitimacy and that of the mode of protection which may be extended to expectations which satisfy the first criterion. The chapter then tackles the problematic question of unlawfully created expectations, focusing on the importance of securing fairness for the individual. It also considers the issues of constitutionality and public interest, along with representations issued by unauthorized officials and representations concerning action which is ultra vires the agency.

Chapter

This chapter shows that judges must substitute their own judgment for that of an administrative authority on some issues, in order to give effect to the principle of legality. When there is reason for non-deferential judicial review, deference would mean abandoning the rule of law. The more interventionist grounds on which judges will control the substance of some decisions—relevance, proportionality, and legitimate expectations—may involve little deference, depending on the type of decision and the context in which it is made. Each of the interventionist doctrines gives the judges the opportunity to do justice for a claimant and to improve public administration. For the very same reasons, each doctrine poses a danger that the judges will make themselves into surrogate administrators by overextending the grounds of judicial review

Chapter

This chapter explores procedural impropriety, the final of the three grounds for judicial review outlined by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v Minister for the Civil Service. Procedural impropriety has the following elements. The first is a failure to comply with any procedural requirements set out in statute. Secondly, there is a broader heading of failing to act ‘fairly’, the core of which are the rules of natural justice. These rules can be summarized as the right to be heard and the right to a fair hearing. However, a clear understanding of procedural impropriety, and in particular the idea of fairness, still remains elusive.

Chapter

This chapter shows that judges must substitute their own judgment for that of an administrative authority on some issues, in order to give effect to the principle of legality. When there is reason for non-deferential judicial review, deference would mean abandoning the rule of law. The more interventionist grounds on which judges will control the substance of some decisions—relevance, proportionality, and legitimate expectations—may involve little deference, depending on the type of decision and the context in which it is made. Each of these interventionist doctrines gives the judges the opportunity to do justice for a claimant and to improve public administration. For the very same reasons, each doctrine poses a danger that the judges will make themselves into surrogate administrators by overextending the grounds of judicial review.

Chapter

The discussion of illegality as a ground continues in this chapter. The first concern here is to explain the importance to decision-making of the fettering principle since deciding by reference to a policy has the capacity to undermine statutory discretion. Sections are included on legitimate expectation relating to circulars and policy, estoppel and the fettering of discretion, fettering discretion by contract, and fettering discretion by wrongful delegation. In the final sections the chapter considers technical aspects of illegality including: the distinction between errors of law and errors of fact, the emergence of error of precedent fact, the ‘no evidence’ principle, and challenges to the validity of delegated legislation. The case law in this area is analysed in some detail.