This chapter first reviews some fundamental tenets of Marxist social and political theory, and then outlines some of the ways in which the place of law has been conceptualised in Marxist theory. This is followed by a discussion of an account of law that is heavily influenced by Marx, namely the critical legal studies movement.
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13. Marxist and Post-Marxist Theories of Law
J. E. Penner and E. Melissaris
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Postscript
H. L. A. Hart
Celebrated for their conceptual clarity, titles in the Clarendon Law Series offer concise, accessible overviews of major fields of law and legal thought. This Postscript attempts to reply to some of the criticisms urged by R. M. Dworkin in many of the seminal articles collected in his Taking Rights Seriously (1977) and A Matter of Principle (1985) and in his book Law's Empire (1986). The focus is on Dworkin's criticisms because he has not only argued that nearly all the distinctive theses of this book are radically mistaken, but he has called in question the whole conception of legal theory and of what it should do which is implicit in the book. The first part of the Postscript is concerned with Dworkin's arguments. The second part considers the claims of a number of other critics that, in the author's exposition of some of his theses, there are not only obscurities and inaccuracies but at certain points actual incoherence and contradiction.
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6. Post-Hart Analytical Philosophy of Law: Dworkin and Raz
J. E. Penner and E. Melissaris
This chapter explores the main currents in legal philosophy following Hart, focusing on the work of Dworkin and Raz. It begins with overviews of the philosophies of law of Dworkin and Raz. The chapter then discusses Dworkin and Raz on rules and principles; Dworkin’s theory of law; whether lawyers are moral philosophers; Raz and the authority of law; and the impact of the work of Dworkin and Raz.
Book
James Penner and Emmanuel Melissaris
Fully updated and revised McCoubrey & White’s Textbook on Jurisprudence clearly breaks down the complexities of this often daunting yet fascinating subject. Sophisticated ideas are explained concisely and with clarity, ensuring the reader is aware of the subtleties of the subject yet not overwhelmed. With chapters dedicated to both key concepts and leading theorists, this text takes a wide-ranging look at jurisprudence and places central ideas in context. In particular it centres around one of the leading theorists, H. L. A. Hart, and considers the landscape of jurisprudence in relation to his seminal The Concept of Law, looking at the key ideas that influenced him and considering the response to his work. Coverage of post-modern and feminist legal theory is also included, alongside discussion of key theorists such as Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, and John Rawls. Logically organised to support the topics commonly taught on jurisprudence and legal theory courses, this text provides an easy-to-follow and digestible account of this wide-ranging subject, making it the ideal companion text for further reading and research throughout your course. New to this fifth edition are: substantial revision of Part 1: Theories of the Nature of Law; discussion of philosophical issues in law, featuring three new chapters: The Building Blocks of Law: Norms and their Nature; Governing and Obedience; and Law and Adjudication; chapters on the political and legal philosophies of Hobbes, Kant, and Rawls; and substantial revision of the chapters on Marxism and postmodern legal theory.
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12. Legal reasoning and ethics
This chapter introduces legal reasoning. It first outlines the skills to analyse how judges decide cases. There are various points of view that judges can (and do) take in deciding the outcomes of cases, so the chapter introduces some of the theory behind judicial reasoning before moving on to show how judges reason in practice, how one case can give rise to multiple judgments, and the importance of legal ethics.
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12. Legal reasoning and ethics
This chapter provides an introduction to legal reasoning. It first outlines the skills to analyse how judges decide cases. There are various points of view that judges can (and do) take in deciding the outcomes of cases, so the chapter introduces some of the theory behind judicial reasoning before moving on to show how judges reason in practice, how one case can give rise to multiple judgments, and the importance of legal ethics.
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13. Critical legal theory
Critical legal theory rejects what is generally regarded as the natural order of things, be it the free market (in the case of Critical Legal Studies), ‘meta-narratives’ (postmodernism), the conception of ‘race’ (Critical Race Theory), and patriarchy (in the case of feminist jurisprudence). Critical legal theorists share a profound scepticism about many of the questions that have long been regarded as at the core of legal theory. This chapter touches on the first three of these movements. It first discusses the development of critical legal studies and then turns to postmodern legal theory, considering the views of Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Jürgen Habermas. It then outlines the principal claims of Critical Race Theory (CRT), and considers the relationships between CRT and feminist theory and CRT and postmodernism.
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1. What’s it all about?
This introductory chapter sets out the book’s scope and primary goals, and outlines some useful works on jurisprudence recommended by instructors in American law schools. It explains the central concerns of the subjects, distinguishing between descriptive legal theory, normative legal theory, and critical legal theory, and describes Lon Fuller’s entertaining hypothetical ‘Case of the Speluncean Explorers’, a popular launching pad for the comprehension of legal ideas. The important concept of the rule of law is discussed and analysed. There is an extended account of the controversial question of whether judicial review is undemocratic. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the point of legal theory.
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3. Classical legal positivism
This chapter examines the important theory of legal positivism that has long dominated jurisprudence. It explains the core ideas of the theory, and then considers the leading proponents of classical legal positivism, especially the leading nineteenth century philosophers, Jeremy Bentham and John Austin. Bentham is best known as a utilitarian and law reformer, but he insisted on the separation between the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ of law, or what he preferred to call ‘expositorial’ and ‘censorial’ jurisprudence, respectively. Austin was equally emphatic in maintaining this distinction, but his analysis is generally regarded as much narrower in scope and objective than Bentham’s.
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5. Dworkin and law’s moral claims
This chapter discusses the essential elements of Dworkin’s theory of law. It focuses on Dworkin’s assault on positivism and his insistence upon the close relationship between morals and the law. By denying the positivist separation between law and morals, he expounds a theory that rejects the proposition that judges either do or should make law, and contends instead that judges have an obligation to find and express ‘the soundest theory of law’ on which to decide hard cases; and concludes that, since judges (who are unelected officials) do not make law, the judicial role is democratic and prospective. His approach is based on the notion that only by adopting this view of the judicial function can the law take rights seriously.
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5. Hart’s Theory of Law
J. E. Penner and E. Melissaris
This chapter explores Hart’s construction of a better theory, in particular in contrast to the theory set out by Austin. The discussions cover the importance of rules; obligation and the internal aspect of rules; the union of primary and secondary rules; the rule of recognition; legal systems and the importance of officials; public international law in Hart’s theory; and the significance of Hart’s theory.
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2. Justifications
Samantha Besson
This chapter discusses the importance of justifying human rights, particularly in response to critics. It explains the following: why we need to justify human rights; what it means to justify human rights; what the different justifications for human rights may be; and what some of the implications of the justifications of human rights may be for other key issues in human rights theory.
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14. Feminist theory
Many of the theories discussed in the previous chapters neglect or even ignore the position of women in society, and how they are treated by the law, the legal system, and other aspects of social, economic, and political life. Feminist writers have, in various ways, sought to correct this imbalance or prejudice. This chapter examines several key elements of feminist legal theories, and explores the origins of feminism; legal feminisms (liberal feminism, radical feminism, postmodern feminism, and difference feminism) and their impact on legal philosophy. It discusses the enormous literature on the subject, and its criticism of conventional jurisprudence.
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2. Natural law and morality
This chapter discusses the relationship between the ancient classical theory of natural law and its application to contemporary moral questions. It considers the role of natural law in political philosophy, the decline of the theory of natural law, and its revival in the twentieth century. The principal focus is on John Finnis’s natural law theory based largely on the works of St Thomas Aquinas. The chapter posits a distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ natural law, examines the notion of moral realism, and examines the tension between law and morality; and the subject of the moral dilemmas facing judges in unjust societies.
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1. Introduction
This introductory chapter discusses the development of the international law. It begins by tracing the development of the law of nations, now known as (public) international law, which grew out of the tradition of the late medieval ius gentium. Over the course of the twentieth century, international law underwent a profound process of expansion. Developments included, inter alia, the creation of international organizations of universal membership with treaty-making powers, a detailed elaboration of the law of the sea, the establishment of permanent bodies for the settlement of international disputes, the prohibition on the use of force by states, and the emergence of various sub-disciplines or specialist areas of work and study.
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1. The Nature of the International Legal System
International law is a description of an entire legal system: the international legal system. It is an international legal system by which legal rules are created in order to structure and organise societies and relationships. It acknowledges the influence of political, economic, social and cultural processes upon the development of legal rules. This chapter discusses the relevance of international law; the international community and international law; theories of international law; and the practice of international law.
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2. Parliamentary Sovereignty
This chapter examines the ways in which parliamentary sovereignty has been both criticised and vindicated in more recent times, first discussing A V Dicey’s theory of parliamentary sovereignty, which has two parts—a positive limb and negative limb. The principle articulated in the positive limb of the theory is that Parliament can make or unmake any law whatsoever. The proposition advanced in the negative limb is that the legality of an Act of Parliament cannot be challenged in a court. The negative and positive limbs of Dicey’s theory offer a simple principle upon which to base an analysis of the constitution. The chapter then discusses the legal authority for the principle of parliamentary sovereignty and reviews challenges to Dicey’s theory.
Chapter
1. The Nature of the International Legal System
International law is a description of an entire legal system: the international legal system. It is an international legal system by which legal rules are created in order to structure and organise societies and relationships. It acknowledges the influence of political, economic, social and cultural processes upon the development of legal rules. This chapter discusses the relevance of international law; the international community and international law; theories of international law; and the practice of international law.
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1. Introductory Matters
Mark Elliott and Jason Varuhas
This introduction provides an overview of administrative law and administrative power in the UK. It begins with a discussion of the ‘red light’ and ‘green light’ theories of administrative law, along with judicial review. In particular, it considers the scope and intensity of judicial review, why judicial review is expanding, and whether (more) judicial review is a good thing. It then examines the debate about the constitutional basis of judicial review, focusing on the ultra vires doctrine and its modified version, and whether judicial review must be related to legislative intention. It also explains administrative power in the modern UK constitution, paying attention to the main features of the devolution systems, the powers and nature of the devolved institutions, the political and legal accountability of devolved administrations, and the powers of the local government.
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5. Corporate personality
This chapter deals with the legal personality of a company which is separate from its members, capable of owning property, entering into contracts and being a party to legal proceedings. It considers the case Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, in which the House of Lords affirmed separate corporate personality by rejecting attempts, on behalf of creditors, to impose liability for a failed company’s debts on its controlling shareholder. The consequences of separate corporate personality are also discussed, particularly with respect to a company’s human rights (or personal rights). In addition, the chapter examines the process known as ‘piercing the corporate veil’ in relation to the evasion principle; how an artificial entity can have legal personality; and a number of particularly significant court cases. Finally, it looks at corporate law theory and considers whether companies are grammatically singular or plural.
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