This chapter discusses Article 102 TFEU, which applies to abusive conduct engaged in by undertakings in a dominant position. The dominant position must be held in a ‘substantial part’ of the internal market for EU competition law to apply. Abuses can take many forms, and include conduct designed to preserve or expand the power of the undertaking (‘exclusionary abuses’) and conduct aiming to exploit the power of the undertaking (‘exploitative abuses’). No exemptions are available, but the alleged abusive conduct may be defended on the grounds that it is ‘objectively justifiable’ or if there are efficiency justifications. A breach of Article 102 TFEU may incur penalties, damages, and a requirement of conduct modification.
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This chapter discusses the difficult concept of what constitutes an ‘abuse’ of a dominant position for the purposes of Article 102 and whether conduct should be condemned on account of the form it takes or only for its effects. It considers the case law of the EU Courts, the decisional practice of the Commission, and the Commission’s Guidance Paper on enforcement priorities, and the problem of distinguishing competition on the merits from illegimate conduct. The chapter looks at the different classifications of abuse, particularly exclusionary and exploitative abuses; the distinction between form- and effects-based approaches to types of abuse; the leveraging of market power between distinct markets as a theory of harm; the objective justification defence; and general issues in respect of abuses concerning prices, including the ‘as efficient competitor’ test. The chapter then examines the application of Article 102 to various forms of conduct, including: price discrimination; predatory pricing; selective low pricing; margin squeeze; exclusive dealing;; tying and bundling; refusal to supply; self-preferencing; malicious pursuit of legal proceedings; ‘regulatory gaming’; discrimination abuses; unfairly high and low pricing; hindering inter-Member State trade; and more novel claimed abuses within the digital economy.
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Article 102 TFEU deals with the unilateral conduct of undertakings with substantial market power. It thus prohibits one or more undertakings which hold a dominant position in the internal market or a substantial part of it abusing that position insofar as it may affect inter-Member State trade. This chapter discusses the role of Article 102 and the controversy attending its application, and introduces the elements which must be established before the prohibition applies. The Commission’s review of Article 102 and the publication of its Guidance Paper on enforcement priorities, and the relationship between Article 102 and Article 101, are also considered. The chapter then explores in detail one of the principal limbs of the Article 102 prohibition, namely the concept of an undertaking holding a ‘dominant position’ in a relevant market. The definition of a dominant position in the case law of the Court is discussed, alongside its relation to the concept of substantial market power, including the Commission’s treatment in the Guidance Paper. The chapter then considers how dominance is established, addressing, inter aliai, the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Article 102; the role of market share in establishing dominance; barriers to entry and other factors indicating dominance; and dominant positions in the digital economy. Article 102
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This chapter discusses the main features of Article 102 of the Treaty of Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which is concerned with the abusive conduct of dominant firms. It begins by discussing the meaning of ‘undertaking’ and ‘effect on trade between Member States’ in the context of Article 102. It then considers what is meant by a dominant position and looks at the requirement that any dominant position must be held in a substantial part of the internal market. Thereafter it discusses some general considerations relevant to the concept of abuse of dominance, followed by an explanation of what is meant by ‘exploitative’, ‘exclusionary’ and ‘single market’ abuses. It then discusses possible defences to allegations of abuse, and concludes by considering the consequences of infringing Article 102.
