This chapter discusses the objective boundaries of discretionary powers and the way in which the courts police them. Inherent in all discretionary power is the power to decide freely, whether rightly or wrongly, without liability to correction, within the area of discretion allowed by the law. Until fairly recently this liberty to make mistakes within jurisdiction extended to significant mistakes both of law and of fact. The extent to which both these classes of error have been brought within the scope of judicial review is explained.
Chapter
8. Jurisdiction Over Fact and Law
Sir William Wade, Christopher Forsyth, and Julian Ghosh
Chapter
9. Errors of law and control of fact finding
Administrative authorities deciding someone’s legal position must determine what the law is, and find the facts, and apply the law to the facts. This chapter asks how the courts control the exercise of power involved in each of those three elements of the application of the law. The chapter explains the famous decision of the House of Lords in the Anisminic case, and explains why that decision does not support the doctrine of ‘review for error of law’, which is commonly thought to have been established in Anisminic. The chapter explains why a power to apply the law is a discretionary power and concludes with a discussion of the fundamental union (downplayed and sometimes denied by the judges) between judicial review for error of law and other forms of control of discretionary power.
Chapter
11. Judicial Review on the Ground of Illegality
This chapter focuses on judicial review on the grounds of illegality. It explains that the ground of ‘illegality’ refers to a decision that is deemed outside the legal powers of the decision-maker. The chapter details the interplay between discretionary powers and the Padfield principle, and describes the various ways in which the principle can be breached, including a simple ultra vires decision, decisions based on irrelevant considerations, using power for an improper purpose, the impact of fettering decision-makers’ discretion, and the improper delegation of discretion. The chapter then describes errors of fact in relation to errors of law, before concluding that illegality is normally about errors of law, not errors of fact.
Chapter
4. The Scope of Public Law Principles
Mark Elliott and Jason Varuhas
This chapter examines the scope of judicial review as it applies to the principles of public law. It first explains why discretionary powers conferred by legislation are not always subject to judicial review before discussing prerogative powers and their amenability to judicial review. It then considers justiciability as the limiting factor in the extent to which the in-principle reviewability of the prerogative is of any practical significance. It also examines issues regarding de facto powers, with particular emphasis on the scope of judicial review, the limits of review and its underlying rationale, and the extent to which contractual arrangements may displace the courts' willingness to review. Finally, it explores which public bodies must respect human rights under Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. A number of relevant cases are cited throughout the chapter, including R v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] QB 815.
Chapter
5. Retention of Discretion
Mark Elliott and Jason Varuhas
This chapter discusses the principles of administrative law which require decision-makers to retain the discretion which they are granted. It first considers the question of delegation of discretionary powers as well as the non-delegation principle before explaining the nature of delegation. It then examines the courts' approach with respect to departmental decision-making in central government and how far the discretionary freedom of the decision-maker designated by statute may be constrained by delegation and the adoption of policies. It also shows why it is often desirable or even necessary for decision-makers to exercise their discretion in line with a policy or a set of criteria. Finally, it looks at judicial moves towards ensuring that exercise of discretion is structured and legally constrained by publicly available policy. A number of relevant cases are cited throughout the chapter, including Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board [1953] 2 QB 18.
