This chapter discusses how judges can defer in appropriate ways to administrative authorities on some issues, while still opposing abuses of power. The chapter explains why the courts defer massively to administrative authorities on some issues involving foreign affairs and national security, public expenditure, planning, and legal and political processes. The mere fact that the law has allocated the power to an administrative body gives rise to a presumption that a court should not interfere unless there is a ground for review other than that the court would have reached a decision. The extent to which a court ought to defer is determined by the three reasons for allocating power to an administrative body: the body’s expertise, its political responsibility, and/or its decision-making processes.
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Mark Elliott and Jason Varuhas
This chapter examines grounds of judicial review that are substantive in two senses: it reduces the range of substantive options open to a decision-maker, or it involves judicial examination of the quality of the reasons for the decision itself, rather than the quality of the process adopted by the decision-maker. The chapter first considers the doctrine of reasonableness or rationality in administrative law before discussing the doctrine of proportionality and the notion of judicial deference in relation to variable intensity review. It also explores the role of the proportionality test in English law and the question of whether English courts are heading towards jettisoning the reasonableness doctrine in favour of utilizing proportionality in all relevant cases.
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This chapter shows that judges must substitute their own judgment for that of an administrative authority on some issues, in order to give effect to the principle of legality. When there is reason for non-deferential judicial review, deference would mean abandoning the rule of law. The more interventionist grounds on which judges will control the substance of some decisions—relevance, proportionality, and legitimate expectations—may involve little deference, depending on the type of decision and the context in which it is made. Each of these interventionist doctrines gives the judges the opportunity to do justice for a claimant and to improve public administration. For the very same reasons, each doctrine poses a danger that the judges will make themselves into surrogate administrators by overextending the grounds of judicial review.
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This chapter analyses some of the leading cases in which the courts addressed different aspects of the Human Rights Act 1998, and draws out the constitutional implications of the courts’ initial conclusions. The discussions cover the interlinked issues of the extent to which the courts have recognised a distinction between Convention articles and Convention Rights, the approach taken to statutory interpretation mandated by s 3, and the use of Declarations of Incompatibility under s 4; the doctrine of judicial ‘deference’ to legislative policy decisions; the ‘horizontality’ of the Act and its impact on the development of the common law; and the status of proportionality as a ground of review of executive action. The chapter concludes with an assessment of whether the Act has triggered a shift in understandings on the proper scope of the doctrines of the sovereignty of Parliament and the rule of law within the modern constitutional order.
