This chapter discusses how judges can defer in appropriate ways to administrative authorities on some issues, while still opposing abuses of power. The chapter explains why the courts defer massively to administrative authorities on some issues involving foreign affairs and national security, public expenditure, planning, and legal and political processes. The mere fact that the law has allocated the power to an administrative body gives rise to a presumption that a court should not interfere unless there is a ground for review other than that the court would have reached a decision. The extent to which a court ought to defer is determined by the three reasons for allocating power to an administrative body: the body’s expertise, its political responsibility, and/or its decision-making processes.
Chapter
This chapter discusses how judges can defer in appropriate ways to administrative authorities on some issues, while still opposing abuses of power. The chapter explains why the courts defer massively to administrative authorities on some issues involving foreign affairs and national security, public expenditure, planning, and legal and political processes. The mere fact that the law has allocated the power to an administrative body gives rise to a presumption that a court should not interfere unless there is a ground for review other than that the court would have reached a decision; the extent to which a court ought to defer is determined by the three reasons for allocating power to an administrative body: the body’s expertise, its political responsibility, and/or its decision-making processes.
Chapter
Mark Elliott and Jason Varuhas
This chapter examines principles of administrative law which seek to prevent abuse of discretion. It first considers the notion that there is no such thing as an unfettered discretion before discussing two key principles that encourage a mode of administration which is faithful to the legislative scheme set out by Parliament: those which require decision-makers to act only on the basis of factors which are legally relevant, and those which dictate that statutory powers may be used only for the purposes for which they were created. It also explores the propriety of purpose doctrine and the relevancy doctrine, citing a number of relevant cases such as Padfield v. Minister of Agrictulture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997.
Book
Mark Elliott and Jason N. E. Varuhas
Administrative Law Text and Materials combines carefully selected extracts from key cases, articles, and other sources with detailed commentary. This book provides comprehensive coverage of the subject and brings together in one volume the best features of a textbook and a casebook. Rather than simply presenting administrative law as a straightforward body of legal rules, the text considers the subject as an expression of underlying constitutional and other policy concerns, which fundamentally shape the relationship between the citizen and the state. Topics covered include: jurisdiction, the status of unlawful administrative action, public law principles, abuses of discretion, fairness, remedies, and the liability of public authorities.
Chapter
Sir William Wade and Christopher Forsyth
Tribunals have attracted the attention of the legislature on several occasions, most recently with the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, which implements far reaching and fundamental reforms seeking to impose system and order on the maze of specialised tribunals. This chapter discusses the 2007 reforms, the procedure of tribunals, and appeals on questions of law and discretion.
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This chapter shows that judges must substitute their own judgment for that of an administrative authority on some issues, in order to give effect to the principle of legality. When there is reason for non-deferential judicial review, deference would mean abandoning the rule of law. The more interventionist grounds on which judges will control the substance of some decisions—relevance, proportionality, and legitimate expectations—may involve little deference, depending on the type of decision and the context in which it is made. Each of these interventionist doctrines gives the judges the opportunity to do justice for a claimant and to improve public administration. For the very same reasons, each doctrine poses a danger that the judges will make themselves into surrogate administrators by overextending the grounds of judicial review.
Chapter
Titles in the Complete series combine extracts from a wide range of primary materials with clear explanatory text to provide readers with a complete introductory resource. This chapter examines ‘illegality’ as a ground for judicial review. Central to judicial review is the idea of ultra vires, which is the principle that public authorities have to act within their legal powers and that if they act or fail to act consistently with their legal powers, they will be acting unlawfully. Case law on the exercise of discretionary powers by public authorities is discussed in depth. In addition, the public-sector equality duty in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 is explained. The concept of jurisdiction and the distinction between error of law and error of fact are also included under this ground of review.
Chapter
This chapter shows that judges must substitute their own judgment for that of an administrative authority on some issues, in order to give effect to the principle of legality. When there is reason for non-deferential judicial review, deference would mean abandoning the rule of law. The more interventionist grounds on which judges will control the substance of some decisions—relevance, proportionality, and legitimate expectations—may involve little deference, depending on the type of decision and the context in which it is made. Each of the interventionist doctrines gives the judges the opportunity to do justice for a claimant and to improve public administration. For the very same reasons, each doctrine poses a danger that the judges will make themselves into surrogate administrators by overextending the grounds of judicial review
Chapter
Titles in the Complete series combine extracts from a wide range of primary materials with clear explanatory text to provide readers with a complete introductory resource. This chapter examines ‘illegality’ as a ground for judicial review. Central to judicial review is the idea of ultra vires, which is the principle that public authorities have to act within their legal powers, and that if they act or fail to act consistently with their legal powers, they will be acting unlawfully. Case law on the exercise of discretionary powers by public authorities is discussed. The issue of jurisdiction is also considered, in particular, the distinction between errors of law and errors of fact.
Chapter
Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147, House of Lords. This note deals with how the House of Lords interpreted an ouster clause, a statutory provision which seeks to prevent judicial supervision of decisions made by subordinate decision-making bodies, and considers the wider constitutional implications of the courts’ approach to ouster clauses. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.
Chapter
Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147, House of Lords. This case note deals with how the House of Lords interpreted an ouster clause, a statutory provision which seeks to prevent judicial supervision of decisions made by subordinate decision-making bodies, and considers the wider constitutional implications of the courts’ approach to ouster clauses. The document also includes supporting commentary and questions from author Thomas Webb.
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Mark Elliott and Jason Varuhas
This chapter discusses the principles of administrative law which require decision-makers to retain the discretion which they are granted. It first considers the question of delegation of discretionary powers as well as the non-delegation principle before explaining the nature of delegation. It then examines the courts' approach with respect to departmental decision-making in central government and how far the discretionary freedom of the decision-maker designated by statute may be constrained by delegation and the adoption of policies. It also shows why it is often desirable or even necessary for decision-makers to exercise their discretion in line with a policy or a set of criteria. Finally, it looks at judicial moves towards ensuring that exercise of discretion is structured and legally constrained by publicly available policy. A number of relevant cases are cited throughout the chapter, including Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board [1953] 2 QB 18.
Chapter
Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147, House of Lords. This case note deals with how the House of Lords interpreted an ouster clause, a statutory provision which seeks to prevent judicial supervision of decisions made by subordinate decision-making bodies, and considers the wider constitutional implications of the courts’ approach to ouster clauses. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.
