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Essential Cases: Criminal Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in R v Howe [1987] AC 417, House of Lords. The document also included supporting commentary from author Jonathan Herring.

Chapter

Essential Cases: Criminal Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in R v Howe [1987] AC 417, House of Lords. The document also included supporting commentary from author Jonathan Herring.

Chapter

Essential Cases: Criminal Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in R v Howe [1987] AC 417, House of Lords. The document also included supporting commentary from author Jonathan Herring.

Chapter

Essential Cases: Criminal Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, Supreme Court. The document also included supporting commentary from author Jonathan Herring.

Chapter

Essential Cases: Criminal Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, Supreme Court. The document also included supporting commentary from author Jonathan Herring.

Chapter

Essential Cases: Criminal Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8, Supreme Court. The document also included supporting commentary from author Jonathan Herring.

Chapter

Titles in the Core Text series take the reader straight to the heart of the subject, providing focused, concise, and reliable guides for students at all levels. This chapter discusses the liability of accomplices for the crime committed by the principal. A person may be convicted of a substantive offence due to criminal activity he committed with someone else. It is noted that a person is guilty of murder if he knows that another person may deliberately kill or inflict serious injury, but he still takes part with this person in the venture. The derivative liability appears as the accomplice liability.

Chapter

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter discusses the liability of parties who participate in the criminal acts of others. Liability can be split into four parts: those who are accessories, those who are joint perpetrators, those who are vicariously liable, and those who are corporations. Accessories are those who aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of the principal offence. Participants who enter a joint venture (also known as a joint unlawful enterprise) are liable for the crimes committed as part of that venture, unless one of the parties deliberately departs from the agreed plan. The doctrine of vicarious liability has a (limited) role in the criminal law. A corporation is a legal person, so criminal liability can be imposed on a corporation for many (although not all) crimes.

Chapter

This chapter begins with a discussion of the law of complicity, covering principals and accomplices; five ways one can be an accomplice; mens rea for accomplices; secondary participation and inchoate offences; conviction of the secondary party and acquittal of the principal; whether a secondary party can be guilty of a greater offence than the principal; withdrawal by a secondary party; accessories and victims; and assistance after the offence. The second part of the chapter focuses on accessories and the theory of complicity, covering general theories of accessorial liability; theories of accessorial mens rea; the theory of joint enterprise; actus reus issues; withdrawal; and law reform.

Chapter

John Child and David Ormerod

This chapter examines the criminal liability of parties to a crime. Where D involves herself in the crime of another, and that crime is completed, D may not just be liable for her inchoate role, but may be additionally liable as an accomplice. As such, she is labelled and punished in the same way as the principal. This chapter begins with an overview of the current law of complicity and the circumstances where uncertainty can emerge in determining whether D is a principal or an accomplice. It then considers the elements of complicity by aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring; the abolition of complicity by joint enterprise; the relationship between complicity and inchoate liability; and available defences. It outlines options for legal reform concerning complicity and the potential application of complicity within a problem question. Relevant cases are highlighted throughout the chapter, with brief summaries of the main facts and judgments.

Chapter

The commission of an offence may involve not only the perpetrator of the offence but also other people in criminal liability in various ways. A person who directly brings about the actus reus of an offence with the relevant mens rea is known as the perpetrator (or principal). While an accomplice (also known as an accessory or secondary party) participates in the commission of an offence, he does not in law directly bring about its actus reus, even if his assistance or encouragement causes the perpetrator to act as he does. This chapter explains the liability of an accomplice before and after the commission of an offence. It considers joint perpetrators, innocent agency, principal offence, intentional perpetration of an offence which is not the common purpose of a joint criminal venture (a principle which has recently changed with the Supreme Court decision in Jogee), differential liability, victims as accomplices, entrapment and agents provocateurs, withdrawal from participation, and reform of the law of complicity.

Chapter

This chapter examines the criminal liability of parties to a crime. Where D involves herself in the crime of another, and that crime is completed, D may not just be liable for her inchoate role, but may be additionally liable as an accomplice. As such, she is labelled and punished in the same way as the principal. This chapter begins with an overview of the current law of complicity and the circumstances where uncertainty can emerge in determining whether D is a principal or an accomplice. It then considers the elements of complicity by aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring; the abolition of complicity by joint enterprise; the relationship between complicity and inchoate liability; and available defences. It outlines options for legal reform concerning complicity and the potential application of complicity within a problem question. Relevant cases are highlighted throughout the chapter, with brief summaries of the main facts and judgments.

Chapter

This chapter begins with a discussion of the law of complicity, covering principals and accomplices; five ways one can be an accomplice; mens rea for accomplices; secondary participation and inchoate offences; conviction of the secondary party and acquittal of the principal; whether a secondary party can be guilty of a greater offence than the principal; withdrawal by a secondary party; accessories and victims; and assistance after the offence. The second part of the chapter focuses on accessories and the theory of complicity, covering general theories of accessorial liability; theories of accessorial mens rea; the theory of joint enterprise; actus reus issues; withdrawal; and law reform.