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negligently so or not. Such a case could be called a ‘pure diagnosis’ case. At the other end of the spectrum is the second type of case: a ‘pure treatment’ case, where the nature of the

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G. T. Laurie, S. H. E. Harmon, and E. S. Dove

necssarily true in MCS cases. Indeed, the cases could often overlap in the sense that medical evidence can change circumstances, as a number of the above cases worryingly demonstrate

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negligently so or not. Such a case could be called a ‘pure diagnosis’ case. At the other end of the spectrum is the second type of case: a ‘pure treatment’ case, where the nature of the

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G. T. Laurie, S. H. E. Harmon, and E. S. Dove

the case, Emeh became the leading case in England and the practice of allowing damages for the upkeep of an uncovenanted, healthy child was followed in a succession of cases—and these

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child save in the most extreme cases. In such a case the doctor is likely to want a court order authorizing the treatment. Even then it is clear from the case law that it will require a

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G. T. Laurie, S. H. E. Harmon, and E. S. Dove

of itself, sufficient ground to sustain her claim in negligence; it was essential to the success of her case that she proved that her condition had been caused by repetitive movements

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G. T. Laurie, S. H. E. Harmon, and E. S. Dove

treatment which is appropriate in his case, taking into account the nature and degree of the mental disorder and all other circumstances of his case. 51 It does seem that the draughtsman

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G. T. Laurie, S. H. E. Harmon, and E. S. Dove

subject’s medical interests. The solution of some such cases will be obvious—clearly, for example, it would not be essential to obtain court approval before undertaking a hysterectomy

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G. T. Laurie, S. H. E. Harmon, and E. S. Dove

The case gave rise to other claims, such as the case of Eluana Englaro (decision no 334 of the Italian Constitutional Court dated 8 October 2008). For commentary on that case, see

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disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins. Commenting on the likely response to a Tarasoff -type case in the

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treatment, or withholding consent to an essential therapy for their child—for example, a blood transfusion. This is manifestly not such a case. The course of treatment proposed by Mr

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G. T. Laurie, S. H. E. Harmon, and E. S. Dove

v Ministry of Justice. 17 We discuss both the concept and the case below. 19.09 This brings us to the case of Dr Martin which can be seen as a bridge between Dr Moor and Dr

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but also checklists, a pro forma case summary, and advice on the minutiae of conducting interviews. Quite appropriately, he emphasises the essential similarity between representation

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diagnosis’ case, like Muller , there cannot be two right answers to the question of how a patient should be diagnosed, as might be the case in a ‘ negligent treatment’ case. Rather the

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G. T. Laurie, S. H. E. Harmon, and E. S. Dove

without court intervention (under Art 8(2)), but the facts of the case did not bear this out—there was time to refer the case to the High Court and this should have been done. Procedurally

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G. T. Laurie, S. H. E. Harmon, and E. S. Dove

clarification, there is more recent case law which confirms the medical view that persons whose brain stems are dead are, themselves, dead. In the unusual case of Re A 55 —in which the parents

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G. T. Laurie, S. H. E. Harmon, and E. S. Dove

facts of the case. The House held, however, that security of hospital records—and particularly those of a security hospital—was of such importance that it was essential that the source

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G. T. Laurie, S. H. E. Harmon, and E. S. Dove

rise to many cases instigated by an audit of clinics undertaken by the HFEA following an instruction in the case of AB v CD and the Z Fertility Clinic. 81 The first case arising from

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G. T. Laurie, S. H. E. Harmon, and E. S. Dove

perform procedures which are not essential for the patient’s immediate survival or well-being. This was established in two well-known Canadian cases where the courts explored the distinction

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the danger case in the future. It is not permitting the instant case that worries us, but rather the possibility that permitting the instant case will lead to the danger case … Thus