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both clear standard cases and challengeable borderline cases. It is now a familiar fact (though once too little stressed) that this distinction must be made in the case of almost every

commitment. 32 This would seem to be the case with most human experience, but it serves to drive feminist method away from essentialism and, perhaps, relativism, though I am less

decide cases on grounds of policy. That may be so in the majority of cases, yet in D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children and in other hard cases, judges

there is no compelling case in favour of judicial decisions over those of legislators where rights are at stake. Judicial review therefore weakens essential democratic values and rights

idea that a ratio of a prior case can easily be distinguished in a current case, the idea being that the ratio of that prior case is particular to that case and it cannot be used as a

for a valid will, and the so-called sanction of ‘nullity’. In this case, if failure to comply with this essential condition did not entail nullity, the rule itself could not be intelligibly

rule applies to a particular case the law fails to determine an answer either way and so proves partially indeterminate. Such cases are not merely ‘hard cases’, controversial in the sense

nding the essential nature and purpose of Hart’s rule of recognition. This arises mainly through Dworkin’s error in overlooking the fact that, in both hard and easy cases, judges share

its leading precept is often formulated as ‘Treat like cases alike’; though we need to add to the latter ‘and treat different cases differently’. So when, in the name of justice, we protest

g particular cases as instances of general terms, and in the case of everything which we are prepared to call a rule it is possible to distinguish clear central cases, where it certainly

Darwall, in every case of practical authority, the subject of the authority must owe an obligation to the authority to obey its directives. He uses as an example the case of a combined

‘grudge cases’ reconsidered in 1950 (an account of the case is given in H. O. Pappe, ‘On the validity of judicial decisions in the Nazi era’ (1960) 23 MLR 60). Grudge cases were broadly

status in present-day England. Both are law even before cases to which they are applied arise in the courts and, when such cases do arise, the courts apply both Victorian and modern statutes

suggests that certain human rights are more fundamental, more essential, and more universal, than others. If this is the case, these ‘positive’, socio-economic rights, though frequently

both these cases we have looked at the way that an individual’s behaviour can give rise to new norms, but obviously the generation of norms is not restricted to these cases. The power

approach which speaks very clearly to the modern age. This is particularly the case in its analysis of essential naturalist issues in terms of a modern discourse of rights. This is a highly

as they may appear, but what, on a common-sense view (which may not prove adequate) is essential to them, may be expressed as follows. English law, French law, and the law of any modern

philosophical and theoretical interest in the phenomenon of law. What are the defining or essential features of law and legal systems? Is there a moral obligation to obey the law? How do

consists in ‘treating like cases alike’. 106 Is a judge ‘moral’ when he treats like cases alike? Hart accepts that he is. But justice may require that like cases are not treated alike

ons to accept this essential attribute of a free society. ● In the thirteenth century the common law introduced trial by jury in both criminal and civil cases. The jury decides on