- Ross Cranston, Ross CranstonProfessor of Law at the London School of Economics
- Emilios Avgouleas, Emilios AvgouleasProfessor of International Banking Law and Finance at the University of Edinburgh; European Banking Authority Stakeholder Group
- Kristin van Zweiten, Kristin van ZweitenClifford Chance Associate Professor of Law and Finance at Oxford University and a Fellow of Harris Manchester College
- Theodor van SanteTheodor van SanteBarrister at 3 Verulam Building, Gray's Inn, London
- and Christoper HareChristoper HareTravers Smith Associate Professor of Corporate and Commercial Law at the University of Oxford and a Fellow of Somerville College
Banks can become distressed for a range of reasons, just like other firms. These reasons may be internal to the distressed bank (e.g. risky lending practices) or external to it (both at industry level and at the macroeconomic level), or both. Distressed banks, however, are not always subject to the same regulatory regime that governs the treatment of distress in other kinds of firms. Banks have special characteristics and this has led to the special treatment, which is explored in this chapter. The discussions cover the justification for special treatment, special resolution regimes, bank resolution regimes at domestic level, and cross-border complexities.