p. 1806. Parties to crime
- David OrmerodDavid OrmerodProfessor of Criminal Justice, University College London, Barrister, Bencher of Middle Temple, Door Tenant at Red Lion Chambers
- , and Karl LairdKarl LairdStipendiary Lecturer and Tutor in Law, St Edmund Hall, Oxford, Barrister, 6KBW College Hill
Abstract
A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures another to commit an offence is criminally liable and known as an ‘accessory’ or a ‘secondary party’. This chapter focuses on the basis of their liability, the distinction between accessories and principals, how secondary liability differs from inchoate liability, the principal offender, innocent agency, the accessory’s actus reus, whether an omission is sufficient and whether mere presence at the crime is enough. The chapter discusses the Supreme Court decision in Jogee, examining problems of ‘joint enterprise liability’, issues of terminology, the significance of the doctrine of joint enterprise in murder and why the Supreme Court characterized it as involving a ‘wrong turn’. It also deals with withdrawal by a secondary party before the principal offender commits the crime, victims as parties to crime and instigation by law enforcement officers for the purpose of entrapment.
