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Competition Law of the EU and UK

Competition Law of the EU and UK (8th edn)

Sandra Marco Colino
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date: 01 April 2023

p. 42018. The economics of merger controllocked

p. 42018. The economics of merger controllocked

  • Sandra Marco ColinoSandra Marco ColinoResearch Assistant Professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong


This chapter deals with the key arguments that underpin the policy goals behind merger control which, in essence, relate to two factors: first, the creation or extension of monopoly power, including the raising of barriers to entry for potential competitors; and second, increasing the scope for collusion in a market which, post-merger, will be more oligopolistic and less competitive than was the market premerger. The first of these two factors is related to the control of dominant firm conduct; dominance itself is not condemned in either the EU or the UK. Nevertheless, in merger control there is a situation where the attainment or extension of dominance may be condemned or prevented.

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