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The Modern Law of Evidence

The Modern Law of Evidence (14th edn)

Adrian Keane and Paul McKeown
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date: 02 October 2022

p. 50716. Adverse inferences from an accused’s silence or conductlocked

p. 50716. Adverse inferences from an accused’s silence or conductlocked

  • Adrian KeaneAdrian Keaneof the Inner Temple, Barrister, Emeritus Professor of Law, The City Law School, City, University of London, Former Dean of the Inns of Court School of Law
  •  and Paul McKeownPaul McKeownof Lincoln’s Inn, Barrister, Associate Professor of Law, The City Law School, City, University of London

Abstract

This chapter discusses the adverse inferences that may be drawn against an accused from: his failure to testify; his failure, when questioned or charged, to mention facts which he could reasonably have been expected to have mentioned at that time and which he later relies on in his defence at trial; his failure or refusal, on arrest, to account for any object, substance, or mark that the police reasonably believe may be attributable to his participation in the commission of an offence; his refusal to consent to the taking of an intimate sample, such as a sample of blood, semen, or urine; and his failure to provide advance disclosure of the defence case, the nature of his defence, or the facts on which he takes issue with the prosecution.

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