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Jones & Sufrin's EU Competition LawText, Cases & Materials

Jones & Sufrin's EU Competition Law: Text, Cases & Materials (8th edn)

Brenda Sufrin, Niamh Dunne, and Alison Jones
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date: 25 April 2024

p. 6589. Horizontal Agreements—Cartels and Collusionlocked

p. 6589. Horizontal Agreements—Cartels and Collusionlocked

  • Alison Jones, Alison JonesSolicitor, Professor of Law, King’s College London
  • Brenda SufrinBrenda SufrinSolicitor, Emeritus Professor of Law, University of Bristol
  •  and Niamh DunneNiamh DunneSolicitor, Associate Professor of Law, London School of Economics


This chapter examines how EU competition law applies both to undertakings operating cartels and to undertakings that tacitly coordinate their behaviour on a market. It starts by looking at the difference between ‘explicit’ and ‘tacit’ collusion. The chapter then deals with cartels and other agreements akin to cartels, or which may facilitate explicit or tacit collusion on a market. Next, it considers the problem of tacit collusion and whether, in particular, Articles 101 and 102 operate as effective mechanisms for dealing with the oligopoly problem. The chapter also considers other options that EU competition law might offer to deal with tacit collusion, either ex ante or ex post, such as the use of the concept of collective dominance and sector inquiries under Regulation 1/2003, Article 17.

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